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Security: m18h/kanea

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Kanea installs a daemon that runs as root, holds every secret on the node, and can open a shell in any container on it. Vulnerability reports are taken seriously and are welcome.

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue. Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories:

👉 Report a vulnerability

If that is not available to you, email michael@essandoh.dev.

Please include what you need to make the finding actionable: affected version (kanea version), the component (kanead, kanea-edge, the API, the dashboard, the MCP server, the installer), reproduction steps, and what an attacker gains.

You should get an acknowledgement within 5 days and an assessment within 14 days. Please give a fix a reasonable window before disclosing publicly; if a report is valid and you would like credit in the advisory, say so.

Supported versions

The latest release is supported. Kanea is pre-1.0 and there are no backported security releases: fixes ship in the next tag.

Scope

In scope is anything that crosses a boundary the platform claims to hold:

  • Authentication or authorisation bypass on any API, websocket or MCP route (every one of them is deny-by-default; a route that is not is a bug).
  • Anything that reveals a secret value, whether over the API, the MCP server, the dashboard, the audit log, or a log line.
  • Escaping a workload's isolation: capabilities, seccomp, namespaces, the cgroup ceiling, or a volume mount reaching outside its storage.
  • Crossing a project boundary: a spec, a synced repository, or a webhook that reaches another project's services, secrets or network.
  • Breaking the release chain: the installer, the checksums, the Sigstore signature, or the archive encryption and its restore path.
  • SSRF out of the notification or ACME egress paths.

Out of scope:

  • Anything requiring an operator to already hold the master key or a root shell on the node. That is the trust the design starts from.
  • Findings in containerd, BuildKit or the kernel. Report those upstream; tell us if Kanea's defaults make them materially worse.
  • Automated scanner output with no demonstrated impact.

What is already written down

docs/THREAT_MODEL.md documents the boundaries, the adversaries considered, and the OWASP Top 10 mapping as built. Reading it first will tell you which assumptions are load-bearing, and a report that breaks one of them is exactly the report worth sending.

There aren't any published security advisories

0